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Not Good Enough: India’s Freedom of Information Bill
Has Great Potential to Overhaul the Ills of Secrecy and Inaccessibility
but There Are Inadequacies That Need to be Addressed
by Ri ch a rd N. W in f ie ld an d Sh e r rell Eva n s

A

Duty Act. But the Official Secrets Act remains a primary vehicle of suppression.
It came to life during a time when India was a colony of Great
Britain, which at the time also had its own British Official Secrets Act.
The Acts gave legal sanction to a culture in which information was held
tight amongst the elite, who were separated from the masses of the population. Much of India, historically and today, is poor and half is illiterate. Corruption re p o rtedly is widespread. Two-thirds of the population
are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, yet rural citizens frequently complain that they are unable to access land records and information on land entitlements. People critically affected by the building of
a major dam in the Madhya Pradesh region and by the Union Carbide
Corporation gas disaster in that same region in 1984 re p o rtedly still have
not been able to get crucial information.
Extreme measures have been used to maintain social distinctions
and impede the free flow of information. Scores of journalists have been
arrested for their work or on sometimes dubious charges, police and mili t a ry officers on numerous occasions have clashed violently with journalists protesting conditions, newspaper offices have been raided, journalists
beaten, and books banned, especially if they have objectionable religious
themes.
This is the India of old, and it is clashing with the India of today,
where there are re p o rtedly some “f o rty thousand publications, a hundre d
private television channels on cable, and hundreds of FM radio stations.”
This has contributed to India being “one of the world’s leading countries
in terms of pluralist press and [it] is a promising market,” according to
Re p o rters Without Borders. Journalists were able to ban together re c e n tly to pressure the government to withdraw a new anti-terrorism law, the
Pre vention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO), that would have required
them, at the risk of imprisonment, to re veal their sources and turn over
any information they might have on “terrorist activity.” And in a victory for advocates of open government, the Supreme Court of India, in
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 216, declared that
“transparency of action and accountability perhaps are the two safeguards
which this court must insist upon.”
Indeed, more so than the European Court of Human Rights or the
United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of India has given citizens a positive right to access information held by the government. In
S.P. Gupta v. President of India [1982] AIR SC 149, the Supreme Court
of India found that this positive right was reflected in Article 19 of the
Indian Constitution: “The concept of an open Government is the direct
emanation from the right to know which seems implicit in the right of
free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a). Therefore,
disclosures of information in regard to the functioning of Government
must be the rule, and secrecy an exception justified only where the
strictest re q u i rements of public interest so demands.”
Yet the Official Secrets Act is still in effect. The Freedom of
Information Bill 2000 does note that the Official Secrets Act, and any
other statute, will cease to be operative “to the extent to which they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.” No other details are given.
Presumably, the public information officer that each public authority is

T LONG LAST, INDIA HAS PRODUCED A BILL on
Freedom of Information. Many other countries around the
world have produced such statutes in their attempts to shed
a communist or colonial past. India now joins those ranks,
more than 50 years after it gained its official independence from Great
Britain in 1947. As India is in the process of discovering, freedom of
information is one of the most fundamental of human rights and key to
building a stable, efficient democracy.
Our opinion of the bill as written, however, is mixed. It contains
many positive provisions – for example, obligating public authorities to
open their activities to public display, requiring eve ry public authority to
appoint a public information officer, imposing time limits on the excludability of information, and for documents that contain sensitive information, allowing reduction so that as much information as possible may be
released. These are great strides. The bill would be a statutory reinforc ement of the right to information already expressed in the Constitution of
India and in the case law for the Supreme Court of India. It has the
potential to be a foundation to overhaul a society long rooted in secre c y,
inaccessibility and illiteracy.
But the bill has many gaping holes. For example, it does not
include any mechanism outside of government, such as the courts, to
which a person who is denied information can file an appeal. It does not
include any education, publicity or training programs for the hundreds
of government officers and millions of residents who have grown accustomed to a vastly different culture, where much information was not supposed to be widely available. There are no sanctions for noncompliance,
and there is no re q u i rement that public agencies publish annual reports
of requests for information that explain how many requests were denied
and why. In short, there is little oversight. Gi ven India’s complex and
unique history, this is unacceptable. It is not enough to merely include
some of the standards of the Council of Eu rope. More must be done in
order to ensure that the bill does indeed, in more than name only, herald
in an era of freedom of information.
As said, the Constitution of India and the Supreme Court of India
already have declared a right to information and expressed that it should
be freely available. Additionally, previous other statutes, such as the
Environment Protection Act, also have made such declarations. Yet, in
many important ways, information in India today still flows as it had for
generations. There are specific things this bill can and should do to
change that. Understanding how and why the bill should be changed
requires a look into the history of India.

INFORMATION IN TIME
EVERY DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION in India is colored by the Official Secrets Act, enacted in 1923. Its far-reaching prohibitions include the making of notes or sketches that might be useful to
enemies of India and possessing information that may affect the sove reignty of India or which was provided in confidence by a government
official. Accused persons have the onerous task of proving their innocence. Other acts in India also have been used to impede free expression,
including the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Customs and Excise
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supposed to appoint will have the discretion to decide whether a request
for information is consistent with either the Freedom of Information Bill
or the Official Secrets Act, and which should triumph.
Numerous international courts have struck provisions that leave
such wide discretion in the hands of government officers when the fundamental right of freedom of expression is at stake.
Decisions that cite the potential dangers of allowing speech and
expression laws to be vague include R v. Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731
(Supreme Court of Canada), Herczegfalvy v. Austria, September 24, 1992
(European Court of Human Rights), Chavunduka and Choto v. Minister
of Home Affairs & At t o rney General, May 22, 2000 (Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe), Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), Lewis
v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1973) and Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969).
The Supreme Court of India, as well, in State of UP v. Raj Narain,
AIR 1975 SC 865, declared that, other than in matters of national security, even the Prime Minister of India should not have the discretion to
decide what information is of public interest and therefore subject to disclosure. That decision left national security concerns as a loophole.
National security has been used as an excuse to withhold information
pursuant to the Official Secrets Act.

ism. Two exe c u t i ve orders also govern the classification of information
pertaining to national security. According to the American FOIA, information is excluded if it is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and is in fact properly classified pursuant to
such order.” This is significantly more limiting than the language found
in India’s Chapter II Section 8. In the U.S., information must be pro perly classified, in accordance with established procedures, in order to be
excluded.

EUROPE
Europe, like the U.S., has recognized the need to balance freedom
of information rights with national security concerns. Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, for example, states that while
e ve ryone may have the right to freedom of expression, the exercise of this
right “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the pre vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
In its case law, the European Court of Human Rights has focused
upon whether restrictions, and related hindrances, to freedom of expre ssion are really “necessary” as stated in the Convention. Typically this
means that there must be a pressing social need. (Nilsen and Johnsen v.
Norway, Judgment of November 25, 1999). Governments bear a high
burden of proof. Additionally, the Eu ropean Court has examined
whether these restrictions, penalties, etc. are pro p o rtionate to any legitimate aim government may pursue. If the restrictions are deemed to be
excessive, that is, they are considered too much in order to achieve the
government’s stated purpose, then the European Court has decided that
the true, and forbidden, goal was to repress speech.
Even speech that may “offend, shock or disturb” is protected; such
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society,” according to the European
C o u rt. (Nilsen and Johnsen, supra, Handyside v. the United Kingdom,
December 7, 1976, Lingens v. Austria, July 8, 1986, Jersild v. De n m a rk,
September 23, 1994).
Last year, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
published a list of recommendations to its member states on the minimum standards for public access to official documents. It was done in
consideration of the “importance in a pluralistic, democratic society of
transparency of public administration and of the ready availability of
information on issues of public interest.” Among the recommendations
was that any limitations on access be “set down precisely in law, be nece s s a ryin a democratic society and be pro p o rtionate to the aim of pro t e c ting.” Additionally, the re p o rt noted that disclosure should be made and
access to information granted – despite concerns for national security,
public safety, criminal investigations and other serious matters – if there
is an “overriding public interest in disclosure.”

NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION BILL, l i k ewise, leaves national

THE FREEDOM OF
security concerns as a loophole. Chapter II, Section 8 of the bill, titled
“ Exemption from disclosure of information,” cuts out of the ambit of the
proposed statute any information the disclosure of which could possibly
“prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the
State, strategic scientific or economic interest of India or conduct of
international relations.” This is so overly vague and far reaching that it
could potentially include anything. Overbreadth in speech legislation
has two impermissible effects: it suppresses speech that should be pro t e c ted, and it risks creating a chilling environment where people afraid of
violating the law avoid making a wide array of speech. As the European
C o u rt said in Ekin Association v. France, (July 17, 2001):
The dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call
for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court. This is
especially so as far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a
s h o rt period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.
This risk exists equally with regard to those publications, other
than periodicals, that discuss issues of topical interest.
This is especially pertinent in India, where journalists often have been
arrested on charges relating to national security.
If India truly desires to overcome its Official Secrets Act and re l a ted history, it will have to more precisely define the types of information
that could fall within the excluded categories. These definitions could be
provided either in the Freedom of Information Bill itself or in companion legislation that goes into greater specificity. There are many international standards.

THE UNITED STATES

JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES

For example, in the United States, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) contains nine statutory exemptions for classified information,
internal personnel rules and practices, information exempt under other
laws, confidential business information (including trade secrets), internal
government communications, personal privacy, law enforcement, financial institutions and geological information. Additionally, there are
e xclusions under the FOIA – all of which involve interf e rences with law
enforcement investigations, foreign intelligence or international terro r-

There are other international standards that caution against using
national security concerns as a vehicle to repress speech and freedom of
information. A group of experts in a wide range of pertinent fields,
including international law, national security, and human rights, met in
1995 to draft the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom
of Expression and Access to Information. The Johannesburg Principles
warn that speech and free information rights should be restricted only
29
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Not Good Enough continued from page 29
where they have the “genuine purpose and demonstrable effect of protecting a legitimate national security interest.” This “genuine purpose” is
specifically defined (in Principle 2) not to include “interests unrelated to
national security, including, for example, to protect a government fro m
embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal information
about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a part i c ular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.”
The Johannesburg Principles, like the European Court, also question the necessity of restrictions on speech and expression. Governments
imposing such restrictions are subjected to scru t i n y. In Principle 1.3, the
Johannesburg Principles outline a three part test that governments must
meet in order to establish that a restriction on freedom of expression or
information is necessary. Namely, a government must demonstrate that:
(a) the expression or information poses a serious threat to a
legitimate national security interest; (b) the restriction
imposed is the least restrictive means possible for protecting
that interest; and (c) the restriction is compatible with democratic principles.

request for information it received, and how many were denied and why.
It should re q u i re a stipulation that most meetings of public agencies
should be public and adequately announced beforehand – as written, the
bill, in Chapter II Section 4 (vi)(c), only requires that public agencies
“publish all relevant facts concerning important decisions and policies
that affect the public while announcing such decisions and policies.”
However, if meetings we re open and announced, people could find
out information immediately and first hand, as well as participate in the
decision making process. That, after all, should be a goal of having fre edom of information and a better informed public. As a Special
R a p p o rteur to the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights
noted, there is an “important link between the ability of people, both
individually and collectively, to participate in the public life of their communities and country, and the rights to freedom of opinion and expre ssion, including freedom to seek and re c e i ve information.”
(E/CN.4/1996/31, para. 64).
India also should consider the merits of having an official ombudsman to oversee how public agencies are complying with requests for
information. The ombudsman could serve in an advisory capacity to the
newly appointed public information officers in each public agency,
answering questions and making sure that they are adhering to the principle of the law. An ombudsman also could serve as an entity to whom
persons denied information can file an appeal. The bill should note, as
well, that persons denied information can file an appeal through the
courts. But making the courts available as an avenue of appeal may not
be enough. Previous statutes such as The Factories Act, 1948 have given
persons denied information the option of appealing to the courts, but
this has been too expensive and gargantuan a task for most people. As a
result, The Factories Act, which has no other appeals mechanism, is ro utinely violated and information not released. In its published recommendations on access to information, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe also suggests that an avenue of appeal be made ava i lable, whether through “a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law.”
India should consider imposing sanctions or penalties for noncompliance with the bill. As written, there are no consequences for non-compliance. Indeed, in Chapter III, Section 13, the bill specifically states that
“no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against a person
for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under
this Act or any rule made thereunder.” And in Chapter III, Section 15
– titled “Bar of jurisdiction of court s” – all courts are specifically barre d
f rom hearing any “suit, application or other proceeding” pertaining to
the Act and any requests for information. The only appeals mechanism
is within the public agencies themselves, and if they refuse to release
information persons are given no recourse under the bill.
The Factories Act, as noted, has given recourse to the courts, but to
little practical avail. A proper solution, howe ve r, is not to entirely remove
the courts as an avenue of appeal – especially since the press or other
groups with financial backing might be more likely than a factory worker to pursue court action if denied a request for public information.
Businesses, entities and organizations that are quasi-governmental
in nature should be subject to the bill as well as public agencies.
The bill should specifically note that persons requesting information should not have to state their reasons for wanting information, and
formalities for requests should be kept to a minimum. These are re c o mmendations on access to information included in the directive of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
There should be a way in which persons who request information
can review that information, free of charge (this is also one of the re c o mmendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).

INDIA
It is doubtful whether India’s Freedom of Information Bill 2000
can meet these standards. According to published re p o rts, journalists
who have explored alleged corruption or questioned authorities have
been frequently beaten and/or arrested on charges that they endangered
national security. And government officials have used the Official Secrets
Act to both restrict publication of sensitive stories and suppress criticism
of government policies. The Freedom of Information Bill is supposed to
supplant the Official Secrets Act to the extent that it conflicts with the
bill. But the bill itself gives national security concerns too much leew a y,
making it unclear how the provisions of the bill conflict with the Official
Secrets Act and other repressive measures. In addition to exempting a
potentially limitless array of information from disclosure, in Chapter III
Section 16 the bill specifically exempts intelligence and security organizations from its ambit.

SIGNIFICANT OMISSIONS
IT IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY THAT the Freedom of Information Bill,
2000 does not specifically cite the rights of the press. Although the pre s s
should not be given expression rights superior to those of ord i n a ry citizens, the press is nevertheless supposed to serve as a public watchdog.
They are the proverbial eyes and ears of the people. This is especially
i m p o rtant in a country where access to government has been impeded
and the relationship between government forces and the media has been
racked with tension. Specific mention of the rights of the press might
s e rve as a reminder of their value for public information officers who
review requests for information. The Supreme Court of India already has
recognized their value and vital link to freedom of information. In
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 783, the
Supreme Court of India said that “it is indisputable that by freedom of
the press [is] meant the right of all citizens to speak, publish and expre s s
their views... Freedom of speech and expression includes within its compass the right of all citizens to read and be informed.”
The bill requires public agencies to release information about their
organization and activities. This is good, but the bill also should re q u i re
government to educate people about the bill itself and its statutory re i nforcement of their right to information – a duty the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe included in their recommendations
to member states. The bill also should require training for the scores of
government officers accustomed to operating in secre c y. It should
require each public agency to publish annual re p o rts on how many
30

For example, India could chose to make records available for public
inspection within the offices of public agencies. Many offices may
already be overcrowded, but free public inspections are necessary in order
to make the right to information a reality for many people. As written
in Chapter II, Section 7, the bill provides for the provision of information only upon payment of “such fee as may be prescribed or [upon]
reject[ion] of the request.”
A presumption in favor of releasing information should be clearly
stated in the bill.
Chapter II, Section 11 of the bill states that requests for information that involve information supplied by third parties, or requests that
might affect third parties, first go through a clearing procedure. Public
information officers are required for release of the information. Nothing
is said as to what should happen if the third party refuses to give its consent – other than that the information should be released anyway, except
for trade or commerce secrets, if “public interest in disclosure outweighs
in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third
party.” But in Gaskin v. United Kingdom (July 7, 1989), the European
C o u rt ruled that the responsibility of a state does not end if third parties
refuse disclosure or are not available to give their consent. States must,
the European Court said, establish an independent entity to decide
whether access is to be granted.

harm test and a public interest override;
2. provide for an independent appeals mechanism for any
refusals to disclose information which operates in a timely
and low-cost fashion and which has full powers to assess
claims, including by viewing records, and to order disclosure ;
3. ensure that there is a body with responsibility for monitoring
and promoting effective implementation of the law;
4. establish mechanisms for tackling the culture of secrecy,
including through training;
5. require public bodies to publish and disseminate widely documents of significant public interest, subject only to reasonable limits based on resources and capacity;
6. impose on private bodies which undertake public functions
the same obligations as public bodies;
7. provide for penalties for willful obstruction of access to
information;
8. provide protection against legal, administrative or employment-related sanctions for whistleblowers, those who (are)
releasing information on wrongdoing or a serious threat to
health, safety or the environment, as long as they acted in
good faith and in the reasonable belief that the information
was substantially true and disclosed evidence of wrongdoing;
9. establish a right to receive information from private bodies
where this information is needed to exercise or protect a right;
10. impose an obligation on private bodies to publish information in the general public interest including where those bodies undertake activities posing a risk of harm to public health
or safety or the environment or where this is necessary to
enable consumers to make informed choices. HRB

GENERAL GUIDELINES
A RECENT CONFERENCE (JULY 2001) was held in Colombo, Sri
Lanka, to explore the right to information in South Asia. Participants
included Article 19, the Centre for Policy Alternatives, the
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI – New Delhi, India),
and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP – Lahore,
Pakistan). They drafted a list of recommendations for countries in the
region to follow in order to ensure the right to information. That list is
reproduced verbatim below and is especially pertinent to India.
All countries in South Asia should adopt right to information legislation. This legislation should:
1. establish a presumption in favor of disclosure which is subject
only to narrow and clearly drawn exceptions which include a

These comments on the Freedom of Information Bill 2000 are submitted on behalf of
the International Senior Lawyers Project by the firm of Clifford Chance US LLP. The
authors wish to thank the International Senior Lawyers Project for the opportunity to
submit these comments
This article was first published in Combat Law: The Human Rights Magazine, based
in Mumbai, India
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